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Abstract
We develop a general equilibrium endogenous growth model of a monetary union 
between two countries that differ in economic dimension and level of development. By 
solving transitional dynamics towards the steady state, we examine the impact of fiscal 
shocks that may lead to excessive deficits. Results suggest that the individual and the 
whole impact of such deficits depend on which country they occur. In such context, we 
argue that the small and less developed country should be allowed to temporarily run an 
excessive deficit, in order to improve economic convergence within the union.
Keywords: Technological-Knowledge Gap; Monetary Union; SGP; Excessive Deficits; 
Numerical Computation.
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1. Introduction
With the creation of the European Monetary Union (EMU), the framework for the 
definition and implementation of macroeconomic policies has dramatically changed. 
Member-Countries have lost their exchange rate and money supply instruments and fiscal 
policy has been restrained by binding rules aimed at avoiding excessive public deficits.
The need for fiscal discipline was justified by the potential external negative effects 
that could result from excessive deficits run by any participant in the eurozone. These 
effects (e.g., De Grauwe, 2005) included a possible increase in the interest rate of the 
EMU, leading to possible pressures on the European Central Bank (ECB) to implement a 
more expansionist monetary policy, thus leading to an increase in inflation. 
Fundamentally, European fiscal rules have been put in place because of the need to keep 
price stability (e.g., Baldwin and Wyplosz, 2006).
The above-mentioned rules included a maximum ceiling for the deficit to GDP ratio 
(3%) and for the public debt to GDP ratio (60%) and were consecrated by the Maastricht 
Treaty (1992). Further, the need for fiscal discipline has been improved by the rules of the 
Stability and Growth Pact (SGP), which assumed a budgetary equilibrium (or even a small 
budgetary surplus) as the fundamental goal in terms of the medium-run, in order to 
preserve some margin for manoeuvre for fiscal policy in the case of a negative shock. The 
SGP also established concrete sanctions to be applied to countries that maintain excessive 
deficits and do not comply with Council recommendations (European Council, 1997).
Since the beginning, these rules have been the main object of discussion among 
academics and politicians with regard to fiscal policy in the eurozone. Positions vary from 
strong support for the current framework to proposals for important changes in it or even 
to appeals for a radical change, which could include the federalisation of fiscal policy
(Alves and Afonso, 2007).
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Among the arguments put forward in favour of major changes in the original SGP,
we find the idea that fiscal rules would differ according to the level of development of the 
Member-Countries and their economic dimension.
The goal of economic and social cohesion would require higher rates of real GDP in 
the less developed countries, which in turn would require stronger public intervention and
would be compatible with temporary public deficit and debt ratios higher than those 
proposed in the SGP. Moreover, several authors (e.g., Mills and Quinet, 2001; Brunila, 
2002; Creel, 2003) suggested the substitution of current rules by the “golden rule” or the 
introduction of rules concerning public expenses (and not strictly the public deficit). 
In particular, some expenses related to public investment would be excluded from 
the calculus of the relevant public deficit concerning the application of the “3 per cent” 
rule, following the idea, expressed in some literature (e.g., Milbourne et al., 2003) that 
public investment may help economic growth.
The other argument concerns external spillovers resulting from excessive deficits in 
one country, as they would only occur or be relevant if such country was big (like
Germany), thus affecting financial markets and price stability in a relevant way.
The debate is not yet closed, but it may already have made a relevant contribution to
the recent SGP reform (European Council, 2005). The “new” SGP allows for a growing 
number of circumstances that lead to a non-automatic application of sanctions, namely 
considering a diversified kind of public expenses that may justify the non-compliance to 
the “3 per cent” rule. As far as the present paper is concerned, it is relevant to note that, 
within that set, expenses regarding R&D are included.
In order to analyse whether or not such kind of public expenses should be treated 
differently and whether or not fiscal rules should differ between countries, we consider a 
standard economic structure in endogenous R&D-growth theory, for two countries that 
compose a monetary union. In each country, the production of perfectly competitive final 
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goods uses institutions and labour together with a continuum set of country specific 
quality-adjusted intermediate goods. Intermediate goods, in turn, use designs (resulting 
from R&D activities) under monopolistic competition. 
The production function, in which the complementarity of inputs, in each country, is 
coupled with substitutability between countries, is adapted from the horizontal R&D 
growth models developed by Acemoglu and Zilibotti (2001) as well as from the vertical 
R&D growth model presented by Afonso (2006). As a result of the close relationship 
between the production of intermediate goods and R&D, this one can be encouraged either 
by a direct subsidy or through a subsidy to the production of intermediate goods. Some 
empirical studies show a positive impact of public intervention on R&D (e.g., Falk, 2006).
These policies have a negative impact on the fiscal budget of each country and that 
situation may lead to adverse consequences, such as those prevented by the SGP.
However, they may reduce the technological-knowledge gap between countries and, 
through this, increase the competitiveness of the less developed one. In this case, they 
could be crucial for an increase in the economic convergence within the union and, in 
particular, for the economic growth performance of the poorer country, thus justifying a 
differentiation in fiscal rules. This will be the focus of the present work.
By assumption, countries differ in three features: (i) economic dimension, measured 
by labour endowments; the one with higher active population is called Big, the other one 
is called Small; (ii) domestic institutions, which are more advanced in the Big-country; 
(iii) domestic quality indexes measuring technological knowledge, which are higher in the 
Big-country, as an endogenous consequence of the other two and measuring the level of 
development of each country.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the model. Section 3 
determines the equilibrium conditions. Section 4 analyses the effects of a governmental 
intervention. Finally, section 5 offers some concluding remarks.
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2. The model
2.1. Final-goods sector
Each final good n  [0, 1] is produced by one of two countries, the Small-country, S, and 
the Big-country, B. The former (latter) brings institutions, AS (AB), and labour, LS (LB), 
together with a continuum set of S (B) specific quality-adjusted intermediate goods, 
indexed by j  [0, J] (j  ]J, 1]). The output of n, Yn, at time t is,


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
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1/),(1/),( ),,()1(),,()( . (1)
The integrals denote the contribution of intermediate goods to production. In the 
Schumpeterian tradition, the quantity of each j, xn, used in the production of the final good 
n is quality-adjusted; i.e., the quality upgrade is q > 1, and k is the top-quality rung at time 
t. The term 1– is the aggregate intermediate-goods input share.
The second and fourth terms on the right-hand side of (1) can be interpreted as 
representing the role of the labour to production, respectively, in S and in B. These terms 
include the labour levels of each country, where, by assumption, LB > LS. The term A is an 
exogenous variable representing the level of productivity, dependent on country’s 
institutions. As B’s institutions are, by hypothesis, more advanced, we consider 
AB > AS > 1, which means that an absolute productivity advantage of LB over LS is 
accounted. A relative productivity advantage of either type is captured by (1-n) and n, 
which implies that LS (LB) is relatively more productive in final goods indexed by smaller 
(larger) ns. The parameter   ]0, 1[ represents the labour input share.
Finally, as we will see below, at each time t there is a competitive equilibrium 
threshold final good n , where the switch from one country to the other becomes 
advantageous. An increase in n  would mean a larger space for production in country S, 
thus appearing as a measure of its relative competitiveness.
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Due to zero profit equilibrium by producers of n  [0, 1], the demand for the top-
quality of j by the producer of n is


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<
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where: pn and p(j) are, respectively, the prices of n and j. A higher pn increases the 
marginal revenue product of the factors, encouraging firms to rent more intermediate 
goods. A higher LS,n or LB,n implies that more labour is used with intermediate goods, 
raising demand. Finally, a higher p(j) means lower demand, since the demand curve for 
intermediate goods is downward sloping. Plugging (2) into (1), we have the supply of n:
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where: djqtQ J tjkS  = 0
]/)1([),()(   and djqtQ
J
tjk
B 
=
1 ]/)1([),()(  , (4)
are aggregate quality indexes, measuring the technological knowledge in the country-
specific range of intermediate goods. 
Let us define G  QB/QS. G accounts for the relative technological-knowledge level 
of B’s specific intermediate goods, giving a measure of the technological-knowledge gap 
between countries or, in other words, of the economic development gap. An endogenous 
relevant result shown later is that G–1 < 1, since S has less labour and worse institutions. 
This result will allows us to analyse if a country specific governmental intervention may 
improve S’s situation, thus questioning the existence of a “one size fits all” fiscal rule.
We define the aggregate output of the union, i.e., the composite final good, as:





=










=  ndtYndtYndtpndtYtptY nnnnn
1
0
1
0
1
0
1
0
)(lnexp)(lnexp)(lnexp)()()( , (5)
where we normalise its price at each time t to one (numeraire). Resources of the union, Y, 
that are not consumed, C, are used in the production of intermediate goods, X, and in the 
R&D sector, R; i.e., Y = X + R + C.
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2.2. Intermediate-goods sector
Since Y is the input in the production of j  [0, 1] and final goods are produced in perfect 
competition, the marginal cost of production of j  [0, 1] is 1, regardless of the country. 
Assuming that the government of each country can subsidise the production of j by paying 
an ad-valorem fraction, zx (more specifically, zx,S in S and zx,B in B), of each firm’s cost, the 
after-subsidy marginal cost of producing j is (1zx); i.e., (1zx,S) in S and (1zx,B) in B.
Following Romer (1990), j embodies a costly design (created in the R&D sector), 
which is recovered if profits at each date are positive for a certain time in future. This is 
assured by a patent law, which protects each leader firm’s monopoly, while at the same 
time, almost without costs, spreading acquired technological knowledge to other firms.
The profit-maximisation price of the monopolistic firms yields the constant over t, 
across j and for all k mark-up )1(/)1(),,( == xzptjkp , which, with zx < , is in fact a 
mark-up over 1. Without any change in government intervention, this mark-up is stable 
over t, across j and for all k. This symmetry is thus dictated by the way in which each j
enters (1) and by the fact that all intermediate good producers use the same input.
Since the leader firm is the only one legally allowed to produce the top-quality, it 
will use pricing to wipe out sales of lower quality. Depending on whether q (1–) is 
greater or lesser than the marginal cost, it will respectively use the monopoly pricing 
)1(/)1( = xzp  or the limit pricing )1( xzqp =  to capture all the market. As in 
Grossman and Helpman (1991, Ch. 4), it is assumed that limit pricing strategy is used by 
all firms. Since the lowest price that the closest follower can charge without negative 
profits is (1–zx), the leader can capture all the market by selling at a price slightly below 
q(1–zx), because q represents the quality advantage over the closest follower.
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2.3. R&D sector
The outcomes of R&D are designs, which improve the quality of intermediate goods and
the quality indexes in (4), while creatively destroying the profits from previous advances
(e.g., Aghion and Howitt, 1992), as the previous best quality loses that status.
As in Afonso (2006), in j at t, a firm engaged in R&D that uses y(k, j, t) flow of Y is 
successful in upgrading the next quality, k(j, t)+1, with instantaneous probability
),(1),( 1),,(),,( tjktjk qqtjkytjkI =  , where: (6)
(i) the R&D activity is located in S (B) if 0  j  J (J < j  1); (ii) 0,),( > tjkq , is the 
positive learning effect of accumulated public technological knowledge from past R&D in 
j (e.g., Connolly, 2003); (iii) ,0,),(1 1 >   tjkq  is the adverse effect caused by the 
increasing complexity of quality improvements in j (e.g., Kortum, 1997).1
As mentioned earlier, w  will allow each of the governments to subsidise R&D 
activities directly, by means of an ad-valorem subsidy zr, which can be country-specific 
(i.e., zr,S in S and zr,B in B). 
2.4. Consumers
A time-invariant number of heterogeneous individuals continuously indexed by a  [0, 1]
decide the allocation of income, which is partly spent on consumption of the composite 
final good, and partly lent in return for future interest. For simplicity, we consider an 
exogenous threshold individual a , smaller than 0.5, since  =>=
a
0S
1
a
B daLdaL : 
individuals aa >  are located in B, whereas individuals aa   are located in S. 
The infinite horizon lifetime utility of the individual a is:
dttexptactaU 









=

0
)(
1
1),(),(
1

 
 
, (7)
1
 As B is more developed, it can instead be considered BSSB  >  (B has a better innovation capacity).
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8
where: (i) c(a , t) is the amount of consumption of the composite final good by the 
individual a, at time t; (ii)  > 0 is the homogeneous subjective discount rate; and (iii) 
 > 0 is the inverse of the inter-temporal elasticity of substitution.
Savings consist of accumulation of financial assets – K, with return r – in the form 
of public debt owned by individuals and in the form of ownership of the firms that 
produce intermediate goods in monopolistic competition.2 Thus, the budget constraint is:





>

+=+
aataw-
aataw-
taKtr-tactaK
BBw
SSw
K if,),(]1[
if,),(]1[
),()(]1[),(),(
,
,
!
!
!& , where: (8)
(i) K(a, t) is the total asset holdings of individual a, with return r; (ii) w(a, t) is the wage of 
individual a, at time t; (iii) !K and !w are ad-valorem taxes on assets and wages, 
respectively, which may be used by the government for fiscal policy purposes (in 
particular, as a means of financing, at least partially, the costs of the above mentioned 
subsidies); (iv) w and !w may differ between countries, but not !K; (v) r is the same within 
the union, as a natural consequence of the monetary union.
Maximising (7) subject to (8) yields the growth rate of consumption, which is 
independent of the individual and is the standard Euler equation:






		






=== !
 
)(11)(ˆ)(ˆ),(ˆ tr-tCtctac K , where adtactC 
1
0
),()( . (9)
2.5. Government
The government of each country may intervene by imposing taxes on wages and/or on 
financial assets and by subsidising the production of intermediate goods and/or R&D 
activities. If necessary, the government may run a public deficit by issuing public debt 
sold to individuals. The budget surplus, BuS, of S and B is thus given respectively by:
2
 The value of these firms, in turn, corresponds to the value of patents in use.
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)()()()(),(),()()())(1(
,,00 ,
tDtrtRztXzdatawdataKtrtBuStr SSwKS SSrSSx
aa
+=+ !! ; (10a)
)()()()(),(),()()())(1(
,,
11
,
tDtrtRztXzdatawdataKtrtBustr BBwKB BBrBBxaa +=+ !!
. (10b)
Where: (i) XS (XB) represents the resources devoted to intermediate goods 
production in S (B); (ii) RS (RB) represents the resources devoted to R&D in S (B); and 
(iii) DS (DB) represents the public debt in S (B). The first and second terms on the right-
hand side represent government tax revenue while the third and fourth terms represent 
government expenditure on subsidies for intermediate goods and for R&D, respectively, 
and the last term relates to interest paid on public debt.
We will be particularly interested in the effects of higher levels of subsidies in the 
less developed country, regarding an eventual convergence towards the level of 
development of the other country.
3. Equilibrium
The dynamic general equilibrium resulting from optimal decentralised behaviour can be 
described by the paths of QS and QB towards the steady state.
3.1. Equilibrium for given technological knowledge
The competitive advantage of either country on the production of the nth final good relies
on the relative productivity related with the quality of national institutions, /1)/( SB AA  and 
on the price of the country-specific labour, as well as on the relative productivity and 
prices of the intermediate goods, because of complementarity in production.
The prices of labour depend on the quantities, LB and LS. In relative terms, the 
productivity-adjusted quantity of LB in production is 111   SBSB LLAA  . As for the 
productivity and prices of intermediate goods, they depend on complementarity with either 
labour, on the technological knowledge in the country-specific range of intermediate 
goods and on the mark-up. These determinants are summed up in QB and QS in (4).
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The endogenous threshold final good n  follows from equilibrium in the inputs 
markets and relies on the determinants of the competitive advantage in final goods.3
1
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It can be related to prices noting that it is indifferent to produce n  in B or S. This 
yields the ratio of index prices of final goods produced in each country,
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Equation (11) shows that a higher economic development gap, G, a larger relative 
supply of labour, LB/LS, and/or a higher relative productivity concerning the quality of 
national institutions, AB/AS , results in a higher fraction of final goods produced in B, thus 
in a small n . By (12), small n  implies a low relative price of final goods produced by B. 
In this case, the demand for B specific intermediate goods is relatively low, which 
discourages R&D activities aimed at improving their quality, as we can see below.
The equilibrium aggregate resources devoted to intermediate-goods production, 
X=XB+XS, and the equilibrium aggregate output, Y=YB+YS, i.e., the composite final good 
in the union (5), are expressible as a function of the currently given factor levels,
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Equation (13b) shows clearly that: (i) economic growth is driven by the 
technological-knowledge progress, reflected in the aggregate quality indexes; (ii) the 
3 The competitive equilibrium threshold n  arises from profit maximisation by perfectly competitive 
producers of final goods and by monopolist firms producing intermediate goods, and full-employment 
equilibrium in factor markets. Thus, B produces final goods n > n  and S produces final goods n  n .
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contribution of B for Y is higher, since, by assumption, LB > LS and AB > AS, and, as an 
endogenous result of the model, QB > QS – as will be shown later.4
3.2. Equilibrium R&D
The expected current value of the flow of profits to the monopolist producer of j, 
V(k, j, t),5 relies on: (i) profits at each t given by (equivalent equation for a producer in B)
Sq
q
Atp
qzLtjk tjkSSSxS in producer afor ,
)1()()1()1(),,( )1(),(
1
)1(1 1
,


% 

 





 
= , (14)
(ii) the given equilibrium interest rate; and (iii) the expected duration of the flow, which is 
the expected duration of the successful research’s technological-knowledge leadership. 
Such duration, in turn, depends on ),,( tjkI . The resulting expression for V(k, j, t) is:
),,()(
),,(),,(
tjkItr
tjk
tjkV
+
=
%
. (15)
Hence, the expected income generated by the successful research on rung kth at time 
t, V(k, j, t) r(t), equals the difference between profit flow, %(k, j, t), which is paid out as 
dividends, and the expected capital loss, V(k, j, t) I(k, j, t), which will occur when rung kth
is replaced by a new one. Thus, r + I is the effective discount rate of the successful R&D.
Under free-entry R&D equilibrium in each country the expected returns are equal to 
resources spent:



<
<
=+
BjJtjkyz
SJjtjkyz
tjkVtjkI
Br
Sr
ini.e.,;1if,),,()1(
ini.e.,;0if,),,()1(),1,(),,(
,
,
, (16)
The equilibrium can be translated into the path of the technological knowledge. The 
equilibrium country-specific technological-knowledge growth rate in S, for instance, is:
4
 Since S is not too backward (i.e., an appropriate taxonomy for B and S would be developed versus
developing, rather than developed versus underdeveloped), it is predictable that inter-country differences in 
prices of final goods are of second order. Moreover, in the context of a monetary union, with single currency 
and common market, prices of tradable goods tend to be very similar, as well as national inflation rates.
5 I.e., V(k, j, t) is the market value of the patent or the value of the monopolist firm, owned by consumers.
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In (17), the term in large brackets is the equilibrium country-specific probability of 
successful R&D, IS, given r and pS, which turns out to be independent of j and k, due to the 
removal of scale of technological-knowledge effects. 
Equation (17) indicates that subsidies may improve technological knowledge and, 
through it, the country’s level of development. Substituting pS in (17) and pB in the 
equivalent equation for B by expressions in (12) and equalling )(ˆ tQS to )(ˆ tQB , we find the 
equilibrium value of n . After that, the equilibrium levels of pS and pB are also revealed.
The equilibrium aggregate resources devoted to R&D, R, at each time t, are 
)()()()(),,(),,()()()( 1
0
11 tILtQtILtQdjtjkydjtjkytRtRtR BBB
J
SSSJBS
 +=+=+    . (18)
Hence, (18) shows that more resources devoted to R&D in each country (and thus in 
the union) are needed to offset the greater difficulty of R&D when the technological 
knowledge in the country-specific range of intermediate goods rises.
3.3. Steady state
Since the aggregate output has constant returns to scale in inputs QS and QB, and Y, X, R
and C are all multiples of QS  and QB , the constant and unique steady-state endogenous 
growth rate, which through the Euler equation (9) also implies a constant steady-state 
interest rate, )( *** BS rrr == , designed by )( *** BS ggg ==  is:






		






======== !
 
*
KBS
*
r-cCRXYQQg 11ˆˆˆˆˆˆˆ ******* & 0ˆˆˆˆ *** ==== nppG BS . (19)
Thus, *r  is obtained by setting the growth rate of consumption in (9) equal to the 
growth rate of technological knowledge – see (17) – and using the equilibrium levels of pS
and pB. Then, *g  results from plugging *r  into the Euler equation (9).
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4. Government intervention
Now, we solve numerically the transitional dynamics towards the steady state to illustrate 
the effect of government intervention on the country-specific technological knowledge. 
The stability properties of the transitional dynamics towards the steady state are block 
recursive, in the sense that we can first determine the stability of G and then recursively 
characterise the behaviour of all the other variables.6 Using these results, we analyse 
whether different fiscal rules may be needed (or not) in order to offset divergences in 
development among member-countries within a monetary union. 
Bearing in mind that r is always unique and using )(ˆ tQS and )(ˆ tQB – see (17) – we
can get the differential equation needed to obtain the path of the technological-knowledge 
gap between countries, G, and then the behaviour of other variables can be characterised:
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From (20) it is possible to give an intuition on how a governmental intervention 
affects equilibrium. Take for instance an increase in subsidies in S. It re-directs R&D 
towards designs that improve relatively more its technological knowledge, which 
increases the relative productivity of its intermediate goods. The development gap 
between S and B falls, but this intervention creates/increases public deficit in S – see (10a).
Using the fourth-order Runge-Kutta classical numerical method, which solves (20) 
with suitable precision, the time path of technological-knowledge gap is displayed, 
bearing in mind the baseline parameter values and labour endowments in Table 1.
6
 We solve the model numerically because the differential equation describing the path of G is non-linear 
and because we want to look at the path of adjustment of some fundamental variables.
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Table 1 (on separate page at the end of the paper) goes about here
We assume that initially G = 1.40, BuS = D = 0 in both countries. For simplification, 
we assume that there are no taxes and consequently there will be no effects on the budget 
surplus of one country resulting from changes in the fiscal policy of the other.
Figure 1 sums up the main results, by comparing paths of (1/G) and n  under no 
public intervention (Scenario 0, Sc 0) with the ones resulting from an exogenous increase 
at t = 0 of: (Scenario 1, Sc 1) zx,S (to zx,S = 0.1); (Scenario 2, Sc 2) zr,S (to zr,S = 0.1); 
(Scenario 3, Sc 3) zx,S and zr,S (to zx,S = zr,S = 0.1); and (Scenario 4, Sc 4) zr,B (to zr,B = 0.1). 
Figure 1 also displays the path of the public deficit to product ratio for S in scenarios 1, 2 
and 3, and for B in scenario 4. Table 2 compares initial and final steady-state values of the 
main variables and initial and final values for the deficit to product ratio in all scenarios.
Figure 1 (on separate page at the end of the paper) goes about here
Table 2 (on separate page at the end of the paper) goes about here
Our results clearly indicate that with no governmental intervention (Sc 0) the inter-
country technological-knowledge gap, 1/G, (and thus the divergence in levels of economic 
development) would grow significantly. That would cause a decrease in the 
competitiveness of the small and less developed country, measured by the decrease in n .
A governmental intervention in S, by way of an increase in zx,S and/or zr,S attenuates 
the inter-country technological-knowledge gap (Sc 1) or even makes it possible for S to 
reduce this gap (Sc 2 and Sc 3), as Figure 1a shows. 
A greater zx,S increases the size of profits that accrue to the producers of intermediate 
goods in S – see (14) –, while a greater zr,S decreases the cost of R&D in S – see (16). In 
this way, an increase in zx,S and/or zr,S boosts the incentives to do R&D in S, thereby 
increasing the growth rate of its technological knowledge, QS in (4), which in turn leads to 
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a higher 1/G. Until the new steady state, such bias increases the supply of intermediate 
goods in S, thereby increasing the number of final goods produced in this country – see 
(11) and Figure 1b – and lowering their relative price at least when compared to Sc 0 – see 
(12). This path continues towards the constant new steady-state level of the mentioned 
variables, implying that 1/G is attenuated (Sc 1) or reverted (Sc 2 and Sc 3), but at a 
decreasing rate until it reaches its new higher steady state level, as depicted in Figure 1a.
As expected, the main adverse effect of the governmental intervention in S is a 
continuous increase in its public deficit and in the ratio between the public deficit and the 
GDP.7 This increase is relatively under control in Sc 1, with an indirect subsidy to R&D 
through subsidising the production of intermediate goods, but assumes too high values in 
Sc 2 and 3, from a certain moment of time, as Figure 1c shows.
It is worth noting that the external negative effects of this governmental intervention
in the small and less developed country, while in line with those expected (De Grauwe, 
2005), are of very limited importance: Table 2 shows slight increases in the price level 
index in B and in the interest rate within the union when compared to the scenario of non-
intervention. In this way, it is possible to argue that financing the deficit running in the 
small country would have no major negative effects across the union.
Finally, we use Sc 4 to compare the effects arising from the same kind of 
governmental intervention in S and B, allowing us to highlight the importance of 
economic dimension on external effects of running a (probably) excessive public deficit. 
As would be expected, the growth rate of the union, g, increases more significantly 
in the case of a direct subsidy to R&D given by B. This would mean a positive effect for 
the whole union, however such intervention would lead to an important increase in the 
technological-knowledge gap and to a significant decrease in competitiveness in S.
7
 Note that the values of the public deficit would be reduced if taxes were also considered.
Page 17 of 21
Editorial Office, Dept of Economics, Warwick University, Coventry CV4 7AL, UK
Submitted Manuscript
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Peer Review
16
The external negative effects of the governmental intervention would be clearly 
stronger in this case, associated with the creation of an excessive public deficit in B, which 
would be rapidly unsustainable, as the path of the public deficit to product ratio illustrates 
(Figure 1c). In this case, we observe a significant increase in the interest rate of the union, 
mainly driven by the need to finance an increasing public deficit, also as an important 
growth in the price level index of S. In this way, it is possible to argue that financing the 
deficit running in the big country would have major negative effects across the union.
From the results of our model it seems to be possible to consider that:
(i) a governmental intervention subsidising R&D led by a small country in a monetary 
union induces external negative effects of very little significance, but generates some 
relevant internal effects, promoting economic convergence within the union;
(ii) a governmental intervention subsidising R&D led by a big country in a monetary 
union induces strong external negative effects, raising the interest rate and the price level 
of the union, at the same time significantly reducing economic and social cohesion;
(iii) temporary differentiation of fiscal rules within the union, allowing less developed and 
small countries to have more margin for manoeuvre in order to implement temporary 
(direct and/or indirect) incentives to R&D, arises as a valid argument, as it may promote 
social and economic cohesion with very small costs;
(iv) in this sense, a direct subsidy to R&D works more rapidly, but has stronger negative 
effects on fiscal discipline, thus its use should be more restricted in temporal terms;
(v) one of the major aspects of the recent SGP reform, namely the consideration of an 
exceptional character of some public expenses related to the development of innovation 
and knowledge processes seems to be reasonable, possibly justifying an excessive deficit;
(vi) our results also point to the relevance of some criticisms made to the homogeneity of 
the European fiscal rules, which do not consider the composition of public expenses or the 
possibility of financing public investment through the increase of public debt.
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5. Concluding remarks
The main purpose of this paper is to discuss one of the main questions raised by the 
emergence of the EMU, namely the homogeneity of fiscal rules for different countries. In 
particular, the paper focuses on the possibility for small and less developed countries to 
run temporarily excessive deficits, in order to improve their economic development and 
the social and economic cohesion within the union.
To this purpose, we develop a dynamic general-equilibrium growth model with two 
countries forming a monetary union. Growth is driven by Schumpeterian-R&D applied to 
intermediate goods which complement labour in each country. In this context, we analyse 
the effects of a governmental intervention through subsidising (directly or indirectly) 
R&D activities and compare them to a situation with no governmental intervention.
An increase in such subsidies in the less developed and small country, S, re-directs
R&D towards designs that improve the quality of the respective intermediate goods, 
increasing their productivity. This decreases the domestic relative prices of final goods 
produced in S. Thus, through the price channel, the inter-country technological-knowledge 
gap is reduced, but at a decreasing rate until it reaches its new steady state. By connecting 
government intervention with the technological-knowledge progress, we relate 
government intervention with the path of relative economic development.
Such an intervention would lead to the creation and increase of public deficits. 
However, should they occur in a small country, their external negative effects would be of 
very little significance, while inducing some relevant internal effects, namely promoting
economic convergence. Conversely, if an excessive deficit were run in the big country, 
strong external negative effects would occur, raising the interest rate and the price level of 
the union, and significantly reducing the level of economic and social cohesion. 
These results suggest that temporary differentiation of fiscal rules within the union, 
increasing flexibility for the less developed and small countries, could promote cohesion 
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with small costs. In particular, the consideration of an exceptional character of some 
public expenses connected to the innovation and knowledge processes would be justified. 
This result goes in line with one of the major aspects of the recent SGP reform.
In future research, we intend to further develop the analysis in order to consider the 
impact on our results arising from issues such as: (i) the possibility of cheaper R&D 
imitation by the less developed country; (ii) the existence of taxation; (iii) the welfare 
analysis; and (iv) the possibility of other positive external spillovers from fiscal policies.
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Table 1. Baseline values of exogenous variables and parameters
Variables Value Variables Value Parameters Value Parameters Value
AB 1.40 LS 1.00  1.00  0.02
AS 1.00 sx,m,sr,m 0.00  6.00  0.70
LB 1.40 !w,m,!K 0.00  1.05 q 3.33
Notes: (i) the baseline values are in line with our theoretical assumptions (for instance, 
AB>AS), Acemoglu and Zilibotti (2001), Connolly and Valderrama (2005), and 
to calibrate the union growth rate around 2.5%; (ii) we consider SLa == 0.42
and this value is normalised to 1; (iii) we start with no public intervention.
Table 2. Initial and final steady-state values of the main variables
1/G n pB pS r g (BuS/Y)B (BuS/Y)S
Initial 0.714 0.360 0.678 1.016 0.046 0.024 0.000 0.000
Sc 0 0.578 0.336 0.661 1.066 0.046 0.025 0.000 0.000
Sc 1 0.654 0.350 0.671 1.036 0.047 0.026 0.000 –0.028
Sc 2 0.773 0.369 0.685 0.998 0.049 0.028 0.000 –0.101
Sc 3 0.877 0.384 0.699 0.971 0.051 0.029 0.000 –0.130
Sc 4 0.431 0.304 0.640 1.143 0.063 0.041 –0.184 0.000
Figure 1. Transitional dynamics
a. Technological-knowledge gap, 1/G b. Threshold final good, n
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